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ABSTRACT
Planet earth is host to a dazzling variety of living organisms. This diversity of life, or "biodiversity,"
is vital to the survival and prosperity of humanity, supplying such vital amenities as food, clothing,
shelter, natural biochemicals useful in medicine, industry, and agriculture, and even irreplaceable
ecosystem services, such as clean air and water. Despite the prodigious amount of biodiversity on
earth, human activities have been depleting it at an accelerating rate that has now reached the level
of a mass extinction event. The five greatest threats to biodiversity can be summarized by the
"HIPPO" acronym:
(1) Habitat loss, (2) Invasives, (3) Pollution, (4) Population, and (5)
Overexploitation. Together, these five factors describe the phenomena largely responsible for the
current mass extinction event, and patent law offers valuable assistance in combating each one.
Though it cannot offer a complete solution to the biodiversity crisis, the patent system can offer
powerful tools to help save biodiversity. On first inspection, patent law might appear an unlikely
ally for conserving biodiversity for at least two reasons. First, beyond bioprospecting, patents would
seem only tangentially relevant to biodiversity loss. Second, as a tool for promoting economic
growth, the patent system might be viewed as contributing to biodiversity loss by those who assume
that economic growth and environmental protection are mutually antithetical. However, patents
can indeed benefit biodiversity. This article illustrates how patents can combat each of the major
threats to biodiversity that constitute the HIPPO acronym. By creating an extinction bar to
patentability, patents create incentives for bioprospectors, biopharmaceutical firms, and countries
that host abundant biodiversity to prevent habitat destruction. Sovereign immunity provides the
federal and state governments with the right to make use of patented inventions useful for
countering invasives. Existing compulsory licensing schemes provide models for how patented
pollution abatement technologies could be widely disseminated to combat pollution. The incentives
created by the patent system can help to create more efficient new technologies capable of
counteracting the damage inflicted on biodiversity by human population growth. Finally, the patent
system has already proved itself adept at spurring the creation of ingenious inventions capable of
alleviating overexploitation of biodiversity. Though far from a panacea, the patent system does have
important roles to play in ameliorating the biodiversity crisis.
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HIPPO, AND THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS

DR. ANDREW W. TORRANCE*

INTRODUCTION

Planet earth is host to a dazzling variety of organisms. Moreover, it is this
tremendous diversity of life that so sharply distinguishes the earth from all other
celestial bodies in the known universe. From unicellular eubacteria and archaea to
massive sequoias and whales, from sessile fungi to swift-flying raptors, and from
plants that produce their own energy via photosynthesis to shrews that must
consume prey every few hours simply to survive, life occupies almost every ecological
niche conceivable, and does so in myriad ways. Estimates of the magnitude of
biodiversity have ranged from as few as 4 million to as many as 111 million extant
species. 1
Since life first appeared on earth about 3.6 billion years ago, 2 the
metaphorical tree of life has sprouted countless branches, each evolving along its own
unique trajectory in response to the contingent opportunities afforded by genetic
potential and environmental challenges. As Charles Darwin so famously proclaimed
in The Origin of Species, "from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful
3
and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved."
Although there is a prodigious amount of biodiversity on earth, human activities
have been depleting it at an accelerating rate that has reached a crescendo of
extinction over the last several generations. 4 Estimated rates of extinction have now
reached several orders of magnitude greater than the background rate of extinction
that prevailed prior to human domination of earth's ecosystems. 5 Edward 0. Wilson,
selecting "cautious parameters ... to draw a maximally optimistic conclusion," has
estimated that 27,000 species suffer extinction per annum, corresponding to seventyfour extinctions per day and three extinctions per hour. 6 Although some have
suggested that extinctions might be significantly lower, 7 and any estimates must

*Associate Professor of Law and Research Associate, Biodiversity Institute, University of
Kansas. B.Sc. (Queen's), A.M., Ph.D., J.D. (Harvard). Prof. Torrance would like to thank Erin
Weekley for her invaluable research assistance with this article. Prof. Torrance would also like to
thank Erin McKibben for the invitation to participate in The John MarshallReview of Intellectual
PropertyLaw (RIPL)Green Issue Symposium, Prof. David Schwartz for his encouragement to do so,
and Nick Dernik and Erin McKibben for their great talents as editors.
'See P.M. Hammond, The Current Magnitude of Biodiversity in GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY
ASSESSMENT 113, 118 (V.H. Heywood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
2 PETER H. RAVEN ET AL., BIOLOGY OF PLANTS 844 (6th ed. 1999).
3 CHARLES R. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 396 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1859).
4 RAVEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 844.
5 BRIAN GROOMBRIDGE & MARTIN D. JENKINS, WORLD ATLAS OF BIODIVERSITY:

EARTH'S

LIVING RESOURCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 55-58 (Univ. Cal. Press 2002). See generallyAndy Purvis
& Andy Hector, Getting the Measure of Biodiversity 405 NATURE 212 (2000) ("There is no doubt
that humans are now destroying [current] diversity at an alarming rate.").
GEDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 280 (1992) [hereinafter WILSON, DIVERSITY OF

LIFE].
7 See BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF
THE WORLD 249-57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1998). But see generally Thomas Lovejoy,
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certainly contemplate significant error bounds, a broad and strong consensus exists
among biologists that biodiversity is currently undergoing the sixth great mass
extinction event in earth's history, and that anthropogenic causes, both direct and
8
indirect, are to blame.
Patent law might seem an unlikely remedy to mass extinction of biodiversity.
After all, patents are usually associated with new technologies and economic growth,
rather than conservation of biodiversity. 9 As an illustration of this perceived
disconnect between biodiversity and patent law, neither the word "patent" nor the
phrase "intellectual property" appear in the leading casebook of biodiversity law in
the United States, 10 the standard treatise of natural conservation law in the United
Kingdom,11 or either or the two leading textbooks of conservation biology. 12 Beyond
the phenomenon of bioprospecting, 13 discussion of the patent system and biodiversity
seldom intersect.
This article argues that the patent system can indeed play important roles in
preserving biodiversity and mitigating its current losses. It highlights five very
different roles patents can play to combat the sixth mass extinction. Each of these
roles is juxtaposed with each of the five greatest threats to biodiversity: the "HIPPO"
factors. Popularized by Edward 0. Wilson, "HIPPO" stands for (1) Habitat loss, (2)
Invasives, (3) Pollution, (4) Population, and (5) Overexploitation. 14 Together, these
five factors describe the phenomena largely responsible for the current mass
extinction event, and patent law offers valuable assistance in ameliorating each one.
Though it cannot offer a complete solution to the biodiversity crisis, the patent
system can offer powerful tools to help save biodiversity.

I. THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
A. What is Biodiversity?
Biodiversity is a term with as many definitions as there are biologists who study
it. Edward 0. Wilson has defined biodiversity as

Biodiversity: Dismissing Scientific Process, 286 SC. AM. 69 (2002) (rebutting most of Lomborg's
substantive claims about biodiversity).
8 See Lovejoy, supra note 7, at 69; see also RAVEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 844 ("The twentieth
century has witnessed the beginning of the sixth [great extinction], but this one is caused by the
activities of a single species, ourselves.").
9 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Undorpihningsof PatontLaw, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
247 (1994).
10

JOHN

COPELAND

NAGLE

& J.B.

RUHL,

THE LAW

OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM

MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2006).
"1 COLIN T. REID, NATURE CONSERVATION LAW (2d ed. 2002).
12 RICHARD B. PRIMACK, ESSENTIALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY (3d ed. 2002); MALCOLM L.
HUNTER, JR. & JAMES GIBBS, FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY (3d ed. 2007).

13See generally e.g., Jim Chen, There 5 No Such Thing as Biopiracy... and It's a Good Thing
Too, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing bioprospecting in relation to environmental
protection and patent law).
14 EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 50 (2002) [hereinafter WILSON, FUTURE OF LIFE].
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The variety of organisms considered at all levels, from genetic variants
belonging to the same species through arrays of species to arrays of genera,
families, and still higher taxonomic levels; includes the variety of
ecosystems, which comprise both the communities of organisms within
15
particular habitats and the physical conditions under which they live.
The most commonly used unit of biodiversity is the species despite the fact that
precise definitions of what constitutes a species vary widely. 16 Some biologists even
doubt the objective reality of any species definition. 17 Charles Darwin himself
observed that "I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of
18
convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other ... ,
Within a single species there usually exists considerable genetic diversity.1 9
20
And, groups of species can together form myriad different ecosystems.

B. The DistributionofBIODIVERSITY
Biodiversity is not distributed uniformly across the earth. Instead, it exhibits a
starkly uneven pattern, with some areas possessing a hyperdiversity while other
areas host hypodiversity. It is possible to discern some general patterns. For
example, biodiversity reaches its maximum extent near the equator and is minimal
at both poles. 21 This remarkable pattern of distribution has long been one of the
22
great mysteries of biology.
Tropical rainforests host the largest concentration of biodiversity on the planet,
accounting for more than half of known species. 23 Tropical coral reefs contain a
disproportionate amount of marine diversity. 24 Consequently, the most biodiverse
areas in the world tend to be clustered within the borders of poor, tropical,
developing countries. For example, more than two thirds of the twenty-five most
biodiverse terrestrial areas on earth-areas called "biodiversity hotspots"-because
they are both highly diverse and severely threatened-occur within the borders of
25
these countries.

15 WILSON, DIVERSITY OF LIFE, supranote 6, at 393.

16See generally SPECIES CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC

THEORY:

A DEBATE (Quentin D.

Wheeler & Rudolf Meier eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2000) (debating various concepts of species that
are prevalent in contemporary biological literature).
17E.g, Jody Hey, On the Failure of Modern Species Concepts, 21 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 447, 449 (2006); Robert J. O'Hara, Systematic Generalization,HistoricalFate, and the
Species Problem, 42 SYSTEMATIC BIOLOGY 231, 242 (1993).
1sDARWIN, supra note 3, at 45.
19 SUSTAINING LIFE:

HOW HUMAN HEALTH DEPENDS ON BIODIVERSITY 3 (Eric Chivian &

Aaron Bernstein eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
20 Id.

21 See Kevin J. Gaston, Global Patternsin Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 220, 220-22 (2000).
22 Soe, e.g., Stuart L. Pimm & James H. Brown, Domainsof Diversity,304 SC. 831, 831 (2004).
23 See T.C. WHITMORE, AN INTRODUCTION TO TROPICAL RAIN FORESTS 31, 58, 65 (2d ed. 1998).

24 SUSTAINING LIFE, supra note 19, at 35.
25 See Norman Myers et al., Biodiversity Hotspots for Conseovation Priorities,403 NATURE

853, 855 (2000).
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In addition to geographic unevenness, different groups of organisms have
produced wildly different numbers of species. To date, more than 270,000 species of
plants have been described by taxonomists. 26 By contrast, only 6,000 species of
eubacteria and archaea have received formal names.

27

Similar disparities exist

among the animals. Vertebrates-the taxonomic group that includes humanscomprise only about 45,000 species, 28 whereas arthropods-including insects, spiders,
crabs, and lobster-can claim a membership of about 855,000.29 In fact, so diverse is
the insect order Coleoptera that J.B.S. Haldane, a famous biologist, concluded that
30
God must have "an inordinate fondness for beetles."

C. Importance ofBiodiversity
Biodiversity is vital to the survival and prosperity of humanity. Far from being
separated from and independent of nature,
The human species evolved as a natural element of diversity in the living
world, and it is a simple ecological imperative that humans depend on other
species and communities to supply the basic requirements of existence and
31
to maintain biosphere function.
Biodiversity provides a variety of vital amenities to humanity. These include not
only conspicuous amenities, such as food, clothing, shelter, tools, labor, protection,
pleasure, and natural biochemicals useful as medicines, industrial and agricultural
biochemicals, and raw material for producing genetically modified organisms, but
also inconspicuous amenities, such as clean air, clean water, well-functioning
biogeochemical cycles (e.g., nitrogen, carbon, oxygen), flood mitigation, erosion
control, control of toxins in soil and water, pest and disease control, pollination and
32
seed dispersal, and many other irreplaceable ecosystem services.
One of the most prominent amenities biodiversity provides to humanity is genes
and biochemicals, many of which are useful in human medicine. 33 As a result of
natural selective pressures acting on organisms' genetic potentials and
environmental challenges, the prodigious variety of life on earth has given rise to
myriad genes and other natural biochemicals. 34
The practice of surveying
biodiversity for useful biochemicals
has become commonly known as
"bioprospecting."35
In economic terms, bioprospecting is the "exploration of
26 SUSTAINING

27 Id. at
28 Id. at
29 Id.
30 Id. at

LIFE, supra note 19, at 16.

10.
16.
3.

supranote 5, at 33.
See generally NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS

31 GROOMBRIDGE & JENKINS,
'32

(Gretchen C. Daily ed., Island Press 1997) (identifying how the quantity and quality of amenities
impact human life).
33E.g., SUSTAINING LIFE, supra note 19, at 119, 121.
3
4E.g., id.
3' Walter V. Reid et al., A New Lease on Life, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 1, 1 (World Res.
Inst. 1993).
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biodiversity for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources." 36 From
nucleic acids (including genes), polypeptides, lipids, and carbohydrates, to chimaeric
combinations of these basic categories, such as lipoproteins, peptidoglycans, and
glycoproteins, to a limitless array of derivative biochemicals, such as "small
37
molecules," biodiversity provides abundant opportunities for bioprospecting.
Biodiversity represents a vast storehouse of natural biochemicals whose
economic value is enormous. For example, in 1993, roughly sixty percent of the best
selling prescription drugs in the United States were derived from biodiversity. 38 A
decade ago, Kerry ten Kate and Sarah Laird estimated that the annual value of
products derived from genetic resources alone ranges from between $500 billion and
$800 billion. 39 From medicinal drugs and botanical medicines to agricultural crops,
crop protectants, and ornamental plants, to cosmetics and non-medical industrial
products and processes, biodiversity provides the raw material for countless
economically-valuable inventions. The Rosy Periwinkle (Catharanthusroseus), a
flowering plant endemic to the island of Madagascar, is perhaps the most famous
example of the benefits of bioprospecting. 40 Edward 0. Wilson has described the
Rosy Periwinkle and its importance:
An inconspicuous plant with a pink five-petaled flower, it produces two
alkaloids, vinblastine and vincristine, that cure most victims of two of the
deadliest of cancers, Hodgkin's disease, mostly afflicting young adults, and
acute lymphocytic leukemia, which used to be a virtual death sentence for
41
children.
In addition, the two therapeutic biochemicals produced by the Rosy Periwinkle,
vinblastine and vincristine, have proved efficacious in treating Wilms' tumor,
primary brain tumors, and testicular, cervical, and breast cancers. 42
The
pharmaceutical firm, Eli Lilly and Company, has earned considerable revenueroughly $180 million per annum-since it began selling vinblastine and vincristine in
the 1960s.43 As an example of how valuable biochemicals derived from biodiversity
44
can be, vincristine sulphate had a retail price of $11,900,000 per kilogram in 1999.
Despite the great benefits biodiversity provides to humanity, it is currently
45
being destroyed at a rapid, and accelerating, rate.

3 Id.
37 See
generally The Biology Project: Biochemistry, http://www.biology.arizona.edu/
biochemistry/biochemistry.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) (providing tutorials on the chemical
structures and mechanisms associated with biological processes).
38 See FRANCESCA GRIFO ET AL., The Originsof PesereiptionDrugs inBiodiversity andHuman
Health, in BIODIVERSITY AND HUMAN HEALTH 131, 135-36 (Francesca Grifo & Joshua Rosenthal,
eds., Island Press 1997).
39 See KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY: ACCESS
TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND BENEFIT-SHARING 2 tbl.1.1 (1999).
40 See WILSON, DIVERSITY OF LIFE, supranote 6, at 283.
41 Jd

42 Id.at 381.
43See id.at 283.

44KATE & LAIRD, supra note 39, at 2 tbl.1.2.

45RAVEN

ET AL., supranote 2, at 844.
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D. Threats to Biodiversity
Humans have increasingly come to dominate the earth's ecosystems. 46 However,
humans are not atypical for altering nature to suit their preferences. As Peter
Vitousek et al. have observed, "All organisms modify their environment, and humans
are no exception." 47 Instead, what sets humans apart from most, if not all, other
organisms is their tremendous success in achieving modification of the earth's
surface. Vast portions of the earth's landmass have been transformed from natural
ecosystems into areas managed intensively for human purposes (e.g., ten to fifteen
percent as agricultural, urban, or industrial land, six to eight percent as pasture for
livestock).48
In total, thirty-nine to fifty percent of land on earth has been
significantly degraded from its natural state, and about forty percent of the primary
production of plants is appropriated for human activities. 49 Even the oceans are not
immune from human domination. More than fifty percent of mangrove ecosystems
have already been destroyed, sixty-six percent of fisheries are either overexploited or
maximally exploited, and humans appropriate about eight percent of the total
primary production of ocean organisms.

50

As a direct or indirect consequence of human activities, biodiversity is currently
being liquidated:
Although species have gone extinct since life began, what distinguishes
present-day extinctions from those that have occurred in the past is a
51
distinctive human fingerprint.
The human activities most responsible for causing the current acceleration in the
extinction rate may be described by the mnemonic device "HIPPO."52

Habitat

destruction leads very quickly-and sometimes immediately-to the extinction of
organisms dependent on that habitat destroyed.53 Invasive species often displace
native species and alter native ecosystems. 54 Pollution, such as the nitrates,

55
sulphates, and phosphates, poison, weaken, and sometimes kill native biodiversity.

Human population competes with other forms of life for both space and natural
resources. 56 Overexploitation of trees, mammals, and fish have led to collapses in
their populations. 57
Although each of the HIPPO factors alone threatens

46Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth'sEcosystems, 277 SeI. 494, 494 (1997)
[hereinafter Vitousek et al., Human Domination].
47 Id.

48 Id.

at 494-95.

49Id. at 495; Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Appropriationof the Products ofPhotosynthesis,
36 BIOSCIENCE 368, 368 (1986).
50Vitousek et al., Human Domination,supra note 46, at 495.
SUSTAINING LIFE, supra note 19, at 29.
52 WILSON, FUTURE OF LIFE, supra note 14, at 50.
53

d

54

Id.

S5Id.
5G Id.
5o7Id.
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biodiversity, the toxic stew of all HIPPO factors that currently prevails poses a clear
58
and present danger to the extinction of countless species.
Although seldom associated as a contributor to conservation, the patent system
can help to staunch the loss of biodiversity in a number of significant ways.

II.

PATENT LAW

A. The PatentBargain
Society generally disfavors monopolies, in part because monopolies tend to inflict
a deadweight loss on society due to inefficiently low production and monopoly pricing
of goods or services. 59 No less an inventor than Benjamin Franklin wrote that "as we
enjoy great Advantages from the Inventions of others, we should be glad of an
Opportunity to serve others by any Invention of ours, and this we should do freely
and generously."60 Nevertheless, a patent affords its owner a monopoly right to
exclude others and to sell patent goods and services for monopoly prices. 61 Patents
are allowed as an exception to the general rule against monopolies in order to create
economic incentives for innovation by rewarding inventors for their efforts. 62 In
63
return, the inventor is required to add to society's "storehouse" of knowledge.
Society is free to use this new knowledge, but is prohibited from making, using,
64
If
selling, offering to sell, or importing a claimed invention during the patent term.
' 65
scientists make progress by "standing on the shoulders of Giants," the patent
system is intended to incentivize the creation of additional shoulders.
Because many inventions are the results of attempts to solve specific technical
problems, patented inventions tend to be practical and useful. 66 Though not a
panacea, the patent system can be useful in spurring the creation of solutions to the
some of the challenges facing biodiversity.

B. PatentableSubject Matter
Patentable subject matter encompasses myriad categories of inventions. In
response to a patent application filed by Ananda Chakrabarty, a professor of biology
at the University of Illinois, in which he claimed a genetically engineered a

5

d

59 GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 326-34 (3d ed. 2004).
(3BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 192 (Leonard W.
Labaree et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (1791).
61 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
(32U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.

806, 816 (1945).
In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (describing content and term of patents).
(5 JAMES GLEICK, IsAAC NEWTON 98 (2004).
(

(34 35

i( See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Pseudomonas bacterium capable of metabolizing hydrocarbons, 67 the United States
Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") declared that patentable subject matter could
include "anything under the sun that is made by man."68 Subsequently, judicial and
administrative decisions expanded the categories of patentability to include
multicellular organisms, 69 plants,70 mammals, 71 computer software,72 and even
73
methods of doing business.

C. Requirements of Patentability
The Patent Act imposes a number of statutory requirements that patent
applications must meet before they can mature into valid patents.7 4 An invention
must satisfy the legal requirements of novelty, 75 nonobviousness, 76 utility, 77 and
disclosure. 78 In addition, a patent application must include at least one "claim,''79 a
precise description of the metes and bounds of whatever aspects of the invention the
80
inventor seeks to exclude others from practicing.

D. Patents in Practice
Patenting is a relatively expensive undertaking, costing an average of more than
$11,000 simply to file a patent application,8 1 and considerably more to have a patent

67 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980); see Microganisms Having Multiple
Compatible Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids & Preparation Thereof, U.S. Patent No.
4,259,444, at [75], col. 16 11. 21-26 (filed June 7, 1972) (issued Mar. 31, 1981).
68 Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309.
69 ExParteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426-27 (B.P.A.I. 1987).
70 J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001).
71E.g., Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984)
(issued Apr. 12, 1988).
72 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 196 (1981) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
73State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998), abrogatedbyln re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
71See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2006).
7,Id.§ 102.
76Id. § 103.
77Id. § 101.
78 Id.§ 112.

79 Id.
80 Id.; Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("It is the
claims that define the metes and bounds of the patentee's invention." (citing Corning Glass Works v.
Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.Cir.1989))).
81 Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparingand Prosecuting a Patent that Holds up in
Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION 2006, at 515, 521-22 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademark, &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 875, 2006), available at WL, 875 PLI/PAT 515 ("For
example, based on the AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005, the average expected charge in
2004 for preparing and filing a utility patent application was $11,218 for a relatively complex
electrical or computer application and $12,373 for a relatively complex biotechnology/chemical
application.").
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granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").82 Patent
prosecution (the process through which a patent application must pass prior to
issuance as a patent) can be a very slow process, generally lasting between two and a
half and five years.83 Once a patent has been issued by the USPTO, its effective term
of enforceability only lasts about fifteen to seventeen and a half years.8 4 And, the
average cost of patent litigation to enforce one's patent rights can readily rise above
85
$5 million, depending on the amount of damages at issue.

E. Purposesof the PatentSystem
Legal authority for the patent system is situated in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8
of the United States Constitution, which states that "The Congress shall have
Power ...To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 8 6 Congress has exercised its Constitutional authority to offer patent
protection to inventors since the first Patent Act of 1790.87 In theory, the availability
of patent protection should "promote the Progress of... useful Arts" by providing a
monetary incentive (that is, monopoly pricing) to inventors to invest their valuable
time, talent, and efforts in technological innovation.88 Instead of providing direct
support for invention through the public purse, the patent system allows Congress to

with Craig Smith, Partner, Fish & Richardson P.C. (Mar. 5, 2007).
The USPTO Performance Report for fiscal year 2006 reports an average patent pendency

82 Interview
83 Id.

time (defined as time from filing until patent issued or application abandoned by applicant) of 31.1
months and shows that this figure has been increasing over the past few years. U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2006 22 (2006) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2006/2006annualreport.pdf.
However, the
average
pendency times estimated by the USPTO are likely underestimates. Kristen Osenga, Entrance
Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes-Proposalsfor Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office,
33 FLA.ST.U.L.REV. 119, 129-30 (2005).
[T]he average prosecution (or pendency) time for an ultimately successful patent
is 3.6 years, with a median of 2.7 years. Anecdotally, the time period from filing
to issuance varies by technology and ranges from twenty-four to thirty-six months
for chemical and mechanical arts and thirty-six to sixty months for electrical and
software arts.
Osonga, supra.
81 See id., see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) ('[A patent] term begin[s] on the date on which
the patent issues and end[s] 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was
filed .. ").
85 Fiala & Wright, supra note 81, at 522.
In comparison, the average estimated costs associated with litigating a patent in
2005 as reported by the [AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005] were:
$769,562 for a patent infringement suit in which less than $1 million was at risk;
$2,637,179 for a suit in which between $1 and $25 million was at risk; and
$5,175,753 for a suit in which more than $25 million was at risk.
Id.
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793) (current version tit. 35 (2006)).
88 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
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rely on the prospect of private monopoly profits to incentivize inventive activity.8 9
Furthermore, monopoly pricing inflicts only a limited deadweight loss on society
because the patent term is limited in time to roughly 20 years. 90 Society receives
information benefits from a patent as soon as it is published, 91 and then, after a
patent expires, its owner can no longer exclude others from practicing its
92
technologies.
By incentivizing the creation of new technologies, and by providing various
means by which those technologies may be disseminated and practiced, the patent
system can augment the goal of biodiversity conservation in a number of important
ways.

III.

PATENT LAW AND BIODIVERSITY

Humanity is currently causing an extinction event of a magnitude that life on
earth has not suffered for millions of years. 93 The many anthropogenic factors
threatening biodiversity can be organized into five major categories conveniently
called the HIPPO factors. 94 In order of severity, these causes of extinction are: (I)
95
habitat loss, (2) invasives, (3) pollution, (4) population, and (5) overexploitation.
Patent law can provide many useful tools to combat each of the major causes of
biodiversity extinction. To illustrate the usefulness of patent law in combating
biodiversity loss, one patent conservation tool is highlighted for each of the HIPPO
factors.

A. PatentsAgainst HabitatLoss96
In the realm of biotechnology, satisfying patent law's enablement requirement is
sometimes accomplished by depositing the gene, biochemical, or organism of interest
in a biological depository. 97 Biological deposits "of living material may enable a
claimed invention whose manufacture or use depends thereupon."98 Although this
89 See id.
90 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); MANKIW, supra note 59, at 328-29 (discussing the effects of

monopoly pricing on society).
91See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (discussing how publication of a patent application generally
occurs approximately eighteen months after the filing date of the patent application).
92 -d.§ 154(a)(1)-(2).
93 See RAVEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 844 ("Spanning the 3.5 billion year history of life on
Earth, there have only been 5 great extinction events, each apparently cause by environmental
cataclysms .... the beginning of the sixth extinction event has been brought about through human
activity.").
94WILSON, FUTURE OF LIFE, supra note 14, at 50.
95Id
96 A more detailed discussion of the "extinction bar to patentability" appears in Andrew W.

Torrance, An Extinction Bar to Patentability,20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2008), of which this
section is a distillation.
97 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL

OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2402 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP]; In re
Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1220-21 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
98 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1359 n.25 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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approach may be feasible in the case of small biological materials, such as
biochemicals, cells, or microorganisms, it is infeasible for biological depositories to
store and propagate larger, multicellular organisms, such as animals, plants, or
fungi. 99 This physical size limitation on the capacity of biological depositories
represents
a challenge
for many
biotechnological
inventions
because
macroorganisms, such as plants, insects, and fish, are far more diverse than
microorganisms, 100 and so represent a larger potential pool of biochemicals and other
biological materials useful as raw materials for inventors. For inventions based on
macroorganisms, an alternative to existing ex situ depositories would be useful.
In 1980, Dr. Kenneth L. Rinehart, Jr. filed a patent application claiming, among
other inventions, a process for preparing a natural biochemical named didemnin. 10 1
Dr. Rinehart was a distinguished professor of chemistry at the University of Illinois,
and a pioneering researcher in the field of natural biochemicals chemistry, in
general, and marine natural biochemicals, in particular. 10 2 One form of didemnin,
didemnin B, was "the first marine-derived compound to undergo phase I clinical
trials as an anticancer agent and was also the first to reach phase II testing for
efficacy." 10 3 Didemnin and similar biochemicals tend to exhibit a variety of
therapeutic
properties,
including
strong
antiviral,
antitumor,
and
immunosuppressive activity. 0 4 Dr. Rinehart derived didemnin B from colonial
marine tunicates, small urochordate animals commonly called "sea squirts" that are
10 5
usually found on tropical coral reefs.

99One method might be to house the organism in a zoo or farm-like setting. However, for the
vast majority of taxa, whose survival requirements are either unknown, poorly understood, or
maddeningly complex, this solution would be both infeasible and risky, especially if a population of
the organism representing its genetic or biochemical variability is required to enable more than
narrow claims. Furthermore, biological depositories that comply with the requirements of the
Budapest Treaty on the International Regulation of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes
of Patent Procedure do not accept whole-organism "deposits" of such organisms. See Budapest
Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent
Procedure art. 2(i), April 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241, 1861 U.N.T.S. 361 (amendedon Sept. 26, 1980),
availale
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/budapest/trtdoes-w0022.html#Pl9-196
(' [D]eposit of a microorganism' means ... the transmittal of a microorganism to an international
depositary authority, which receives and accepts it, or the storage of such a microorganism by the
international depositary authority, or both the said transmittal and the said storage.").
100
In fact, multicellular plants, fungi, and coral animals may be the most fruitful sources of
novel natural biochemicals in nature. See RAVEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 843, 846 (suggesting
plants are an important source of new drugs, agricultural improvements and other technologies).
101
U.S. Patent App. No. 06/186,932 (filed Sept. 12, 1980) (abandoned); see U.S. Patent No.
4,950,649 (filed Dec. 23, 1987) (issued Aug. 21, 1990).
102 Guy T. Carter et al., Editorial, Special Issue in Honor of ProfessorKenneth L. Rinehart, 70
J. NAT. PRODUCTS 329, 329-30 (2007).
103 Id. at 330; see Craig M. Crews et al., Didemnin Binds to the ProteinPalmitoyl Thioesterase
Responsible for Infantile Neuronal Ceroid L/pofuseinosis, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sm. 4316, 4316
(1996).
104See Kenneth L. Rinehart et al., Biologically Active Natural Products, 62 PURE & APPLIED
CHEMISTRY 1277, 1277-79 (1990); see also Kenneth L. Rinehart, Jr. et al., Didemnins: Antivira]
and Antitumour Depsipeptides from a Caribbean Tunicate, 212 SC. 933, 933-34 (1981)
("[C]ompounds in the tunicate extract offered promise both as antiviral agents and potentially, as
antitumor agents as well.").
105 See Rinehart et al., supra note 104, at 1277.
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After a long and difficult prosecution of his patent application in the USPTO,
resulting in the final enablement rejection of several key claims "for lack of deposit of
the marine tunicate," Dr. Rinehart appealed the rejections to the Patent Board of
Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI").106 Agreeing with Dr. Rinehart, the BPAI
reversed the rejection, and held that the disclosure provided in the patent application
satisfied the enablement requirement despite the lack of a biological deposit of the
marine tunicate.107 The BPAI decided that Dr. Rinehart had provided sufficient
detailed information about the source taxon to enable the claims at issue.10 8 As the
BPAI explained:
With respect to the lack of deposit of the marine tunicate, we find that the
source of the marine organisms necessary for practice of the invention is
described in detail in the specification by reference to specific locations in
the sea.
The marine tunicates are a well known class of marine microorganisms
having definitive characteristics. Appellant has described the phylum,
subphylum, class, order and suborder as well as where the organisms are
located and how they can be obtained. The marine microorganisms are
neither new nor unique but are commonly known and generally available to
the public without any undue experimentation. In this area of technology,
the written description sufficiently discloses how to obtain the tunicata from
various specified locations in the sea. Accordingly, we see no necessity for a
deposit of the organism. 10 9
Ex parte Rinehart recognized an alternative form of biological deposit. A
biological sample placed into the care of a conventional biological depository may be
described as an "ex situ biological deposit" because the source taxon has been
removed from (ex) its location in nature (situ) and transported to a biological
depository in another location. By contrast, the BPAI, in Ex parte Rinehart,
implicitly recognized a second category of biological "deposit" that may be referred to
as an "in situ biological deposit" because the source taxon, rather than being removed
and transported elsewhere, remains "deposited" in (in) its natural location (situ).110
Under Exparte Rinehart,both ex situ and in situ biological deposits may satisfy the
enablement requirement, as long as the biological deposit remains "available to the
'
public without any undue experimentation."1 11
Ex situ biological deposits are particularly useful "[wihere biological material
cannot be taxonomically described,"112 whereas in situ biological deposits may be
available when ex situ biological deposits are unavailable because the "[ex situ
biological] deposit requirement applies only to biological materials that are not

106

Exparte Rinehart, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1719, 1720 (B.P.A.I. 1989).

107 See id.
108 So

id.

109 Id.(footnote omitted).

110 Soo id.
111Id.
112 Evans

Med. Ltd. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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readily reproducible from their written description [and diagrams]."113 According to
the principles applied in Ex parte Rinehart, an in situ biological deposit is
particularly useful when an ex situ biological deposit is infeasible and the inventor is
able to disclose the specific: (i) in situ location and (2) taxonomic description of the
source taxon upon which enablement depends. 114 In situ biological deposits can
accomplish for physically large taxa what ex situ biological deposits accomplish for
physically smaller organisms, cells, and biochemicals:
sufficient evidence of
enablement when words and diagrams alone would be insufficient. Since most
natural biochemicals are derived from physically larger taxa, recognition of in situ
biological deposits provides significant advantages to inventors of biotechnologies.
For an in situ biological deposit to satisfy the enablement requirement it must
ensure that the source taxon upon which the claimed invention depends be "available
to the public without any undue experimentation."' 115 In accordance with Ex parte
Rinehart, a patent application must provide at least two fundamental categories of
information about the source taxon. First, the disclosure must provide a taxonomic
description of the source taxon of sufficient detail and accuracy to allow a person
having ordinary skill in the art to distinguish the source taxon from other, similar,
taxa. 116 Modern taxonomic methods are well elaborated, and can be used to develop
accurate methods for diagnosing any taxon of interest. 117 These methods often rely
on knowledge of genetics and evolutionary relatedness to ensure successful diagnosis
of a source organism, 118 and increasingly use mathematical phylogenetic analysis of
DNA sequences to infer the evolutionary family tree, or "phylogeny," that links one
taxon to related taxa. 119 Clearly, satisfying this requirement of Exparte Rinehartis
easier for well-described taxa than for taxa new to science.
Second, in addition to taxonomic disclosure, Ex parte Rinehart requires that a
patent application also provide information, such as geographical range and habitat,
120
sufficient to allow a person having ordinary skill in the art to locate a source taxon.
Disclosing the geographical range could involve a detailed written description, set of
geographical coordinates, or map. Since all taxa have specific ecological limitations
on which habitats they can and cannot inhabit, 121 the patent application might
additionally have to provide sufficient ecological information to enable a person
having ordinary skill in the art to locate a source organism within whatever complex
matrix of habitats that occurs within every geographical range. Without detailed
taxonomic and geographic information, one having ordinary skill might have to
employ extraordinary efforts, or "undue experimentation," to locate a source taxon,

1'3 In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
114
115

See Exparte Rinehart,10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1720.
Id.

H16
Id.

A variety of traits are available for taxonomic diagnosis. These include morphological
traits, such as physical size, shape, and color of different parts of an organism, as behavioral,
physiological, and genetic traits. See, e.g., David L. Swofford et al., Phylogenetic Inference, in
117

MOLECULAR SYSTEMATICS 407, 409 (David M. Hills et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).

118 See Tree
of Life:
What
is Phylogeny,
http://tolweb.org/tree/learn/concepts/
whatisphylogeny.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (discussing evolutionary relatedness).
119 Seeo, e.g., Swofford, supra note 117, at 407-514.
120 Exparte Rinehart,10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1720.
121 See, e.g., PAUL COLINVAUX, ECOLOGY 31 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1986).
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resulting in patent claims not enabled by the disclosure of a corresponding patent
application.122
In addition to disclosure of taxonomic and geographic information, one can
imagine that a patent applicant might also prefer to possess information regarding
the conservation status of any source taxon upon whose ability to be located any
patent claims rely for their enablement. After all, any source taxon that cannot be
located without undue experimentation-for reasons of rareness or extinction,
perhaps-may render patent claims invalid for lack of enablement.123 Therefore, a
logical corollary of employing biological deposits, whether ex situ or in situ, to enable
claims is an "extinction bar" to patentability.
This extinction bar to patentability has an analogy in another patent case,
entitled In re Metealfe, in which the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA")
ruled that a reference to a trademark in a patent application could be sufficient to
enable a claimed invention initially.1 24 However, the CCPA then warned that "there
is always the possibility that sometime after the issuance of a patent, the disclosure
which was initially enabling may become 'unenabling."'1 25 As the CCPA echoed in In
re Argoudelis there exists "the possibility that at some future date one skilled in the
art might no longer be enabled to practice the invention [should the ex situ biological
deposit supporting enablement become unavailable]."126 Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), in In re Lundak, warned that "the
applicant or his assigns [must provide] assurance of permanent availability of the
culture to the public through a[n ex situ biological] depository [in compliance with
other USPTO rules]."127 The USPTO Manual of Patent Examination Practice also
considers secondary loss of enablement through loss of in situ biological deposits:
If the biological material and its natural location can be adequately
described so that one skilled in the art could obtain it using ordinary skill in
the art, the disclosure would appear to be sufficient to meet the enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C. [§] 112 without a[n ex situ biological] deposit so
long as its degree of availability is reasonable under the circumstances.
By showing that a biological material is known and readily available or by
making a[n ex situ biological] deposit in accordance with these rules,
applicant does not guarantee that such biological material will be available
forever. Public access during the term of the patent may affect the
enforceabilityof the paten t....

...Those applicants that rely on evidence of accessibility other than a[n ex
situ] deposit take the risk that the patent may no longer be enforceable if

122

See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

123 See id.
124
125
126
127

See In re Metcalfe, 410 F.2d 1378, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
Id.
In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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the biological material necessary to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
128
[§i 112 ceases to be available.
The quid pro quo of the patent bargain involves an inventor receiving a monopoly
right to exclude others from the claimed invention in return for providing society
with an enabling disclosure of that invention. 129 Thus, when disclosure becomes
secondarily nonenabling, it is both logical and equitable that the inventor secondarily
lose monopoly exclusion rights. An extinction bar to patentability ensures that the
patent bargain remains balanced throughout the entire term of a patent.
Recognition of the extinction bar to patentability creates new opportunities for
130
private international law to help solve the biodiversity crisis around the world.
The extinction bar to patentability creates an incentive for the owner of any patent
whose enablement depends on an in situ deposit to ensure survival of the source
taxon. A rational patent owner will protect the source taxon in order to protect any
corresponding patent rights because extinction of the source taxon can lead to loss of
corresponding patent rights. 13 1 The more valuable the patent rights are, the more
efforts a patent owner will make to ensure survival of the source taxon. In the
extreme case of a patent owner whose patent claims cover a blockbuster drug, one
would expect heroic efforts expended to ensure survival of the corresponding source
taxon.
Most biodiversity is concentrated within the borders of tropical, developing
nations. 132 Although these countries have few resources to devote to conservation of
their rich stores of biodiversity, they are disproportionately targeted by
bioprospectors hoping to discover new and valuable natural biochemicals to patent
and commercialize. 133 Recognition of an extinction bar to patentability can create not
only incentives to conserve biodiversity, but can also help to align the interests of
bioprospectors and host countries. To ensure survival of a source taxon, a patent
owner might pursue conservation efforts such as purchasing, leasing, or acquiring
conservation easements to the land on which the source taxon were found, hiring
guards and paying local residents to protect the source taxon and its habitat from
harm, and negotiating with local, regional, or national governments and agencies to
gain cooperation to ensure that the source taxon survives. A rational patent owner
would protect the value of the patent by employing whatever safeguards were
warranted to ensure survival of a source taxon.

MPEP, supra note 97, § 2404.01 (emphasis added).
See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154(a) (2006); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. GenProbe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting).
130 Other efforts have been made to use private international law to conserve biodiversity.
Simple payments for conservation efforts have met with some success. See, e.g., Paul J. Ferraro &
Agnes Kiss, Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity 298 SC. 1718, 1718-19 (2002). More
complicated strategies, such as debt for nature swaps between conservation organizations and
heavily indebted tropical, developing countries, have also been used. See generally e.g., Amanda
Lewis, The Evolving Process of Swapping Debt for Nature, 10 COLO. J. OF INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
431 (1999) (analyzing debt-for-nature swaps as a practical tool to expand international conservation
activities).
131 See In re Metcalfe, 410 F.2d 1378, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
132 See Gaston, supranote 21, at 220-21.
133 See Chen, supra note 13, at 1-6.
128

129
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All organisms are dependent on a web of ecological interactions for survival,
and, consequently, they survive best when they remain integrated within their native
ecosystems. 134 Thus, although the patent system is agnostic regarding how to ensure
the survival of source taxa, patent owners would often decide that habitat
conservation represented the most effective approach. For this reason, the most
effective strategy for conserving a source taxon will often be to ensure that its native
ecosystem is preserved. By ensuring the preservation of its ecosystem, a source
taxon would thus act as a "conservation umbrella" protecting other organisms with
which it shares its ecosystem. Such a positive conservation externality would benefit
both society and biodiversity Given a substantial number of patents claiming
inventions based on natural biochemicals, recognition of the extinction bar to
patentability could spur the creation of a significant network of privately-funded
"patent parks" around the world, but especially in the developing, tropical countries
richest in biodiversity. Countries might even decide to preserve areas rich in
biodiversity for their potential to yield patentable natural biochemicals in the future,
particularly if they assessed the opportunity cost of liquidating their biodiversity as
unacceptably high. The magnitude of the conservation incentive created by the
extinction bar to patentability may be difficult to calculate, but, at the very least, the
incentives it provides to conserve biodiversity will decrease the destruction of land
rich in biodiversity at the margins of land use decisions.

B. PatentsAgainst Invasives
Over the past several thousand years, the ability of humans to travel long
distances has increased significantly. Beginning in the Renaissance, long-range
sailing vessels facilitated intercontinental travel. 135 Since then, millions of humans
have moved from country to country and continent to continent. Today, long distance
travel is routine for millions of people around the world. 136 As human travel has
increased, so has the long-distance movement of other organisms:
In the past couple of thousand years, isolation has been diminished for
many species. The worldwide movement of people, especially with the rise
of maritime shipping in the past few hundred years, has created a new
agent for moving biota around the globe ....137
With respect to biodiversity, "the rate at which biological communities are reshuffled
as species move in and out of them through geographic range shifts has been greatly
138
accelerated by human activities."
134

See COLINVAUX, supra note 121, at 21.

135

See MICHAEL W. MARSHALL, OCEAN TRADERS:

FROM THE PORTUGUESE DISCOVERIES TO

THE PRESENT DAY 24 (1990).
136 See Data Elements, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Research and Innovative
Technology Administrations, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DataElements.aspx?Data=l (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010).
137 MALCOLM L. HUNTER, JR. & JAMES GIBBS, FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 205

(3d ed. 2007).
138 Id.
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Organisms that live outside their native geographic ranges are termed
"exotics. ' 139 Some exotics do not thrive when translocated to new areas. 140 However,
other, "invasive," exotics thrive, often with devastating consequences for native
biodiversity. 4 1 Invasives are "exotic species that have successfully invaded (or are
likely to invade) an ecosystem, causing significant ecological, economic, or human
health problems."142 For example, invasives have been identified as the most serious
threats to the survival of 305 of 877 species listed as endangered in the United
States. 143 And, invasives have been found responsible for US $314 billion in damage
to the economies and environments of Australia, Brazil, India, South Africa, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. 144 In short, invasives are very serious
threats to biodiversity.
Exotic Asian carp illustrate the great threat to native biodiversity posed by
invasives. These carp were introduced through a variety of human actions:
Introductions of Asian carps into waters of the United States are the
result of combinations of direct stockings by or authorized by various
agencies, unauthorized stockings by private individuals, and unintentional
escapes from university research facilities, federal and state agency
145
facilities, and private aquaculture operations.
By various means, Asian carp have spread widely through the Mississippi watershed
since their introduction into the United States. Unfortunately,
Based on experiences with other nuisance species, natural resources
management agencies, fishery and aquaculture scientists, and associated
industries are concerned about the potential ecological and economic effects
146
posed by feral populations of Asian carps.
In 2009, concerns that Asian carp might reach the Great Lakes via the Chicago River
147
reached a crescendo.
Although the Chicago River used to empty into Lake Michigan, in 1900 a
massive engineering project reversed its flow into the Mississippi River. 148 This has

206.
See id.

1:39Id.at
140
141

42

Id.
Id.

143 Brian Czech et al., Economic Associations Among Causes of Species Endangermentin the
UnitedStates, 50 BIOSCIENCE 593, 594 (2000).
44 BIOLOGICAL INVASIONS: ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ALIEN PLANT, ANIMAL,

AND MICROBE SPECIES 7 (David Pimental ed., CRC Press 2002).
145 G. CONOVER ET AL., ASIAN CARP WORKING GROUP, AQUATIC NUISANCE SPECIES TASK
FORCE, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL PLAN FOR BIGHEAD, BLACK, GRASS, AND SILVER CARPS IN THE

STATES
2
(2007),
available at http://www.anstaskforce.gov/Documents/CarpsManagementPlan.pdf.
146 Id.at 4.
147 See goenerally Renewed Mot. for Prelim. Inj., State of Mich. v. State of Ill., No. 2, Original
UNITED

(Feb. 4, 2010) (requesting that the U.S. Supreme Court grant a preliminary injunction against
Illinois to close a lock on the Calumet River to prevent the spread of Asian Carp to Lake Michigan).
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allowed the mixing of biodiversity between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River
watersheds ever since. As the Asian carp has spread throughout the Mississippi
River watershed, it has reached the Chicago River. 149 If the Asian carp were to reach
Lake Michigan through the Chicago River, many fear an ecological catastrophe:
The carp, a non-native species that some fear could destroy the
ecosystem of Lake Michigan by consuming what the lake's native fish eat,
have long been making their way up the Mississippi River, and since at
least 2002 have been the focus of an enormous effort to prevent them from
150
reaching the lake here.
The threat posed by Asian carp isso great that Michigan (supported by Minnesota,
Ohio and Wisconsin) sued Illinois in the Supreme Court, seeking an injunction to
force the closure of locks connecting the Chicago River to Lake Michigan.1 51 In the
meantime, hopes have been resting on an elaborate "barrier system, which acts like a
powerful electric fence," placed across the Chicago River to prevent the Asian carp's
further spread. 15 2 Nevertheless, on January 19, 2010, DNA from Asian carp was
detected inside Lake Michigan, as well as in a nearby river.153
Patents can play a strong role in combating invasives. Inventors have patented
many inventions intended to eradicate, detect, or predict the spread of invasives. For
example, United States Patent Application Number 11/213,710 claims
A non-destructive method for the detection of infestation of a living conifer
tree by a[n invasive] wood boring insect having a specific established fungal
associate, comprising
(a) identifying an infested tree by the visual presence of insect exit holes
of a characteristic shape, size and orientation in the bark and by a
characteristic pattern of visible resin flow not originating from the insect
exit holes
(b) providing an elongated sterile probe having a diameter and length to
accommodate the range of diameters of insect exit holes and length of
connected insect exit tunnels, and having a fungal spore collecting tip,
(c) inserting the probe into an exit hole to collect viable fungal spores or
mycelium,

148

See LIBBY HILL, THE CHICAGO RIVER:

A NATURAL AND UNNATURAL HISTORY 69-75 (2000)

(discussing the reconstruction of Chicago's harbor before the Chicago River was reversed).
149 See Monica Davey, Voracious Invader May Be Nearing Lake Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2009, at A13.
150 Id.

151 Michigan v. Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 1166 (2010) ("Motion of Michigan for preliminary injunction

denied."); see Renewed Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 147.
152 Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, Illinois Tries United Front Against Fish and Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at A21.
153 Renewed Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 147, at 2; Susan Saulny, Carp DNA s Found i
Lake Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at A13.
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(d) withdrawing the probe from the exit hole, and
(e) matching the fungus with a wood boring insect species known to have
15 4
a specific established fungal associate.
United States Patent Number 7,536,979 includes
[Claim] 1. A method of controlling noxious plant species, the method
comprising:
identifying a target area in a foraging area, wherein the target area
includes a noxious plant specie;
selecting a treatment period, wherein ungulates will interact with the
noxious plant specie in the target area; and
providing a highly-palatable, portable, self-limiting, animal feed
supplement at a first deployment location in the target area wherein the
supplement attracts the ungulates to the target area and increases a
length of stay of the ungulates in the target area.155
And, United States Patent Number 7,308,392, which includes
[Claim] 1. A computer-implemented method of predicting species invasions,
the method comprising:
receiving native species occurrence
environmental information;

information;

receiving

native

formulating at least one ecological niche model based on the native
species occurrence information and the native environmental
information;
receiving target environmental
alternative geography; and

information

corresponding

to

an

projecting the ecological niche model onto the alternative geography to
15 6
predict characteristics of an invasion of the species.
United States Patent Number 6,125,778, which involves a "treatment [that] provides
an effective, safe; and economical method to render ballast water free of

154

U.S. Patent App. No. 11/213,710, at 13 (filed Aug. 30, 2005).

155 U.S. Patent No. 7,536,979 col. 20 11. 59-67, col. 21 11. 1-2 (filed Dec. 14, 2005) (issued May

26, 2009).
1 c U.S. Patent No. 7,308,392 col. 15 11.4-15 (filed Jan. 12, 2002) (issued Dec. 11, 2007).
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contaminating organisms," even cites the National Invasive Species Act as one of the
157
motivations behind the invention.
Invasives, such as the Asian carp, can present a clear and present danger to new
ecosystems they colonize. For example, having reached the Great Lakes, Asian carp
now threaten "a $7 billion fishing industry and [lakes that] contain 20 percent of the
world's freshwater." 158 Michigan and other states bordering the Great Lakes must
now act immediately to prevent the Asian carp from establishing itself in this new
ecosystem. 159
Delay in these efforts could result in permanent ecological
catastrophe.1 60 Patent law provides several powerful options that allow the federal
and state governments rapid, or immediate, access to patented technologies useful in
preventing or combating spread of invasives: sovereign immunity.
If the federal government need not act immediately against an invasive, "patent
breaking" is an option. Patent breaking refers to total abrogation or revocation of the
rights conferred by a patent. The Paris Convention forbids immediate patent
breaking, warning that "[f]orfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in
cases where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to
prevent the said abuses."1 61 As a prerequisite to breaking a patent, the government
must institute a compulsory licensing scheme because "[n]o proceedings for the
forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two
years from the grant of the first compulsory license." 162 According to the terms of
both the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the World Trade
Organization Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") sideagreement, patent breaking involves an additional requirement that "the scope and
duration of [government sanctioned] use shall be limited to the purpose for which it
'1 63
was authorized."
Cipro® provides an instructive illustration. On September 18, 2001, exactly a
week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, anthrax-laced letters entered the United States
postal system, killing several people.1 64 Bayer AG, a large German pharmaceutical
company, owned a patent covering Cipro®, or ciprofloxacin, an antibiotic effective in
treating anthrax infections. 165 Demand for Cipro® rose so quickly after the anthrax
attacks began that Bayer could not manufacture enough of the drug to satisfy the
157U.S. Patent No. 6,125,778 col. 2 11.5-31 (filed Mar. 15, 1999) (issued Oct. 3, 2000).

Saulny, supra note 153.
159 Renewed Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 147; see Monica Davey, Be Careful What You
Fish For, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at WK3.
160 Davey, supra note 159.
161
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5(A)(3), Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention],
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocswo02O.pdf.
158

162

Id.

1 3 North

American Free Trade Agreement art. 1709, §10(c), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.nafta-see-alena.org/en/view.
aspx?x=343&mtpilD=ALL; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
31(c), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.int/english/docs e/legal e/27TRIPS.pdf.
104 Federal Bureau of Investigation - Amerithrax http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithrax
links.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
16)U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444 (filed May 29, 1984) (issued June 2, 1987).
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demand. 166 United States Senator Charles Shumer of New York tried to persuade
the federal government to authorize generic drug manufacturers to produce a generic
version of Cipro® that could satisfy demand while costing less than the patented,
branded version. 167 If Senator Shumer's plan for combating anthrax had been
168
successful, the federal government would have broken Bayer's Cipro® patent.
However, he was unsuccessful, and Bayer's patent rights survived. 169 By contrast,
the Canadian government did precisely what Senator Shumer had suggested, and
allowed the production of generic Cipro® in violation of Bayer's Canadian patent.170
At first, Tommy Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services, doubted
that the government had the legal right to override Bayer's patent rights. 171 But
when the Canadian government decided to allow production of Cipro®, Secretary
Thompson began to use the specter of patent-breaking as a negotiating tactic with
Bayer:
Thursday morning, October 18, Thompson quickly forgot about legal
technicalities when Canada jumped into the Cipro fray. The Canadian
minister of health signed a contract with a generic manufacturer to make
extra ciprofloxacin, expressing concerns about the sufficiency of Canada's
stockpile. The next morning, Thompson started publicly bullying Bayer on
price, threatening to get the law changed so he could ignore the company's
patent.172

Rather than risk loss of their patent, Bayer agreed to manufacture more Cipro®, and
to sell it at a lower its price. 173 Several years later, spurred by worries about the
global bird flu epidemic, the administration of George W. Bush threatened to break
Roche's U.S. patent covering Tamiflu®, but never actually followed through on its
threat. 174 Patent breaking is a very rare occurrence, and has yet to be used by the
federal government of the United States in modern times.
Sovereign immunity provides an alternative way for the federal and state
governments to use patented inventions without permission from their inventors.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity confers to the U.S. federal government the
constitutional authority to infringe U.S. patents without penalty, 175 as well to
166 Anthony York, Is it Time to Bust the C/p-ro Patent, SALON, Oct. 18, 2001, http://archive.
salon.com/tech/feature/2001/10/18/cipro-patent/index.html.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See Keith Bradsher, A Nation Challenged." The Treatment, Bayer Halves Price for Cipro,
but Rivals Offer Drugs Free, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al (discussing Bayer's agreement with
the U.S. Government to reduce the cost of Cipro).
170 York, supra note 166.

Id.
Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma: In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy Thompson
DistortedPatent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 54, available at
171

172

http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/americanlawyerO12002.html.
173

Id.

Sebastian Mallaby, A Double Dose of Failure,WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2005, at A21,
available at http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/06/AR2005110601013
.html.
175 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
174
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authorize others to infringe. 176 Nevertheless, were the federal government to
appropriate a patent, patent owners are entitled to compensation by federal
statute. 177 According to 28 U.S.C. §1498(a)
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license
of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner's remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture....
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and
with the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as
17 8
use or manufacture for the United States.
Thus, the United States has very broad discretion about when and how to
manufacture or use, or authorize to manufacture or use, patented inventions.
The federal government, federal agencies, and nongovernmental actors
authorized by the federal government can practice any patented invention. 179 In
response, patent owners can sue in the United States Court of Federal Claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to recover "reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture," but are not entitled to injunctive relief, willful damages, or attorney
fees.180 As the Federal Circuit has observed, "The government has graciously
consented, in [28 U.S.C. § 1498], to be sued in the Claims Court for reasonable and
181
entire compensation, for what would be infringement if by a private person."
18 2
States also possess sovereign immunity capable of overriding patent rights.
However, patent owners have little recourse if a state chooses to override a patent.
In an attempt to remove from states their sovereign immunity from patent
infringement suits, Congress amended the Patent Act to add 35 U.S.C. §271(h).183
This
amendment
would
have
stipulated
that
"Any
State,
and
any ... instrumentality, officer, or employee [of the State], shall be subject to the

provisions of [the Patent Act] in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity."18 4 The Federal Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 35
U.S.C. § 271(h) in authorizing a patent owner to bring suit against a state for

176 _d,

177 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).
178
179

Id.
Id.

See id.
W.L. Gore, 842 F.2d at 1283.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999).
183 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat 4230 (1992) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2006)).
IS0

181

184

Id.
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infringing a patented invention, 185 but the Supreme Court overturned the Federal
Circuit's decision, instead holding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) violated the Eleventh
Amendment.186

Thus, under the Eleventh Amendment, states do retain sovereign immunity
against patent infringement suits. 187 A state is permitted to engage in activities that,
but for their sovereign immunity, might constitute patent infringement. 188 State
governments can practice any patented invention, and their sovereign immunity
189
protection extends to their instrumentalities and employees.
According to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal or state
governments could practice any patent relevant to invasives without waiting for
permission or a license from the patent's owner. 190 This holds true for any patents
claiming devices or methods for combating invasives. 191 For example, if states
around the Great Lakes so chose, they could use whatever patented anti-invasive
Asian carp technologies they wished, without fear of consequences more serious than
compensating the relevant patent owners. And, unlike the case of patent breaking
and compulsory licenses, the federal and state governments could do so as soon as
192
needed to combat the spread of invasives.

C. Patentsand Pollution
As a result of industrialization and a growing population, humans raised the
concentrations of many chemicals in the environment well above their pre-industrial
levels. 193 Toxic heavy metals, such as lead, mercury, cadmium, and arsenic, now
circulate through the environment at levels dangerous to many kinds of
biodiversity. 194 Combustion of fossil fuels has produced prodigious amounts of
sulphuric, nitric, and carbonic acids leading to acidification of precipitation (e.g., acid
95
In fact, so
rain), soils, and water, leading to measurable damage to biodiversity.
much carbonic acid has accumulated in the oceans that it has already lowered their
acidity by a measurable amount, and may soon make the oceans more acidic than
they have been for at least 20 million years. 196 In addition, advances in chemical
185College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
186Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at, 647-48 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.").
187
U.S. CONST. amend. Xl; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48.
188 U.S. CONST. amend. Xl; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48.
189 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2006) ("[T]he term 'whoever' includes any State,
any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State
acting in his official capacity."); Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48 (holding 35 U.S.C. § 271(h)
unconstitutional).
190 See U.S. CONST. amend. Xl; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48.
191 See U.S. CONST. amend. Xl; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48.
192 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48.
193 See SUSTAINING LIFE, supra note 19, at 69.
194 Id. at 58.
195 Id. at 57.
19 Id. at 69.
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technology have exposed ecosystems to many synthetic chemicals not previously
known in nature. These include persistent organic pollutants (or "POPs"), such as
PCB,197 toxic herbicides and pesticides, 198 biologically-active pharmaceuticals, 199 and
myriad forms of durable plastic. 20 0 Finally, the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, and the global climate change this accumulation is causing, currently
poses one of the most serious dangers to biodiversity, as temperatures, weather
patterns, and sea levels all shift in response. 20 1 Pollution from human sources has
many adverse effects on biodiversity worldwide.
In addition to legal prohibitions, taxation to discourage usage, and
environmental cleanups, the patent system offers a powerful approach to the threat
of pollution: technological innovation. New technologies can replace existing toxins
with more benign substitutes, remediate the effects of toxins already in the
environment by offering methods to detoxify or remove them, and offer new, cleaner,
more efficient processes in the place of older, dirtier, less efficient ones. In fact, one
of the most famous patents claimed an invention useful in cleaning up crude oil
spills. 20 2 Ananda Chakrabarty, a professor of biology at the University of Illinois,
genetically engineered a Pseudomonas bacterium to enable it to metabolize
hydrocarbons, 203 and intended his new bacterium to be introduced into crude oil
spills, where, having an abundant hydrocarbon food source, the modified
Pseudomonas could reproduce exponentially, consume the oil, and then die of
20 4
starvation, thereby minimizing the toxic effects of spilled oil on the environment.
Increasingly, public attitudes have turned against pollution as an acceptable
byproduct of economic activity. 20 5 This has led to abundant environmental litigation,
as well as specific statutory mandates to reduce pollution, such as in the Clean Air
Act,20 6 the Clean Water Act,207 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act,20 8 Toxic Substances Control Act, 20 9 and even the
Endangered Species Act. 210 The Clean Air Act, in particular, has employed the
patent system to achieve its goals of reducing airborne pollution. 211 It has done so
through a system of compulsory licensing. 212 The owner of a patent can exclude
Id. at 54.
Id. at 59.
199 Id. at 55.
200 Id. at 59.
201 Id. at 63-73.
202 See U.S. Patent No. 4,259,444 col. 16 11.23-26 (filed June 7, 1972) (issued Mar. 31, 1981).
203 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
197
198

204 Id.
205

RAVEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 845.

206

Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7401-7626 (2006)).
207

Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1251-1387 (2006)).
208 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75).
209 Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (2006)).
210 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006)).
211 42 U.S.C. §§ 7404(b)(4), 7608.
212 Id. § 7608.
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others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United
States any patented invention. 213 A patent owner may choose to license others to
practice a patented invention, or she may choose not grant licenses at all.214 As the
215
Supreme Court has noted, "[compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system."
If the federal government imposes a compulsory license on a patent owner,
others are allowed to practice the patented invention even without permission from
the patent owner. 216 The government acts in the stead of the patent owner, granting
a compulsory license to itself or to third parties it authorizes. 217 The patent owner
does receive some compensation for the compulsory license, usually an amount
deemed by the government or courts to constitute a reasonable royalty. 218 The Paris
Convention, NAFTA, and TRIPS provide for compulsory licensing, though the
21 9
practice is much more common in other countries than in the United States.
Although there were some efforts to include a broader system of compulsory
licenses in the 1952 amendments to the Patent Act, none were successfully
incorporated. 220 Congress has revisited the issue of including compulsory licenses in
the Patent Act since then, but has yet to act.221 However, both of the compulsory
licensing schemes Congress has enshrined in statute are relevant to controlling
pollution: air pollution control technology (42 U.S.C. § 7608) and nuclear technology
(42 U.S.C. § 2183(c)).222

Congress passed the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 to the Clean Air Act
("CAA")223 in large part "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity
of its population."224 Under the CAA, the primary responsibility for reducing air
pollution rests with states and local governments, who are legally obligated to reduce
225
the concentrations of specified pollutants below maximum allowable limits.
However, Congress realized that meeting these limits would be challenging, and
might require access to expensive new pollution abatement technologies. 226 Thus,
Congress included in the amendments a provision to allow states to take compulsory

213

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).

Id. § 271(d)(4).
215 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
216 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183, 7608.
217 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183, 7608.
218 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); 42 U.S.C.§§ 2183(g), 7608(g).
219 Paris Convention, supra note 161, art. 5(a); NAFTA, supra note 163, art. 1709, § 10; TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 163, art. 31; see Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 215.
220 See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., PROPOSED REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF
THE PATENT LAWS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT 91-92 (Comm. Print 1950).
214

221 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
85TH CONG., COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER SOME NON-AMERICAN

JUDICIARY,

SYSTEMS 1 (Comm. Print 1959).
222 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183(c), 7608.
223

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626).
224 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
225 Id. § 7401(a)(3).
226 136 CONG. REC. S16,877-04, 16,888 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Symms).
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licenses (what the CAA refers to as "mandatory licenses") to air pollution abatement
227
technologies necessary to meet the new federal air quality standards.
In order to receive a compulsory license to use a patented pollution abatement
technology, a state had to satisfy certain conditions. First, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") must make a formal request to the U.S.
Attorney General for a compulsory license to allow governmental or commercial
practice (or continued practice), of the patented air pollution abatement
technology. 228 Then, the Attorney General must certify that the patented technology
is "not otherwise reasonably available," "is necessary" to meet air quality standards
mandated by the CAA, 229 "there are no reasonable alternative methods to accomplish
such purpose," 230 and failure to grant a compulsory license would result in a
significantly anticompetitive market for the technology. 231 Finally, this certification
must be made to a federal district court, "which may issue an order requiring the
person who owns such patent to license it on such reasonable terms and conditions as
23 2
the court, after hearing, may determine."
Congress also set up a statutory compulsory licensing framework for patented
nuclear energy technologies.2 33 Here, the Department of Energy ("DOE") must first
"giv[e] the patent owner an opportunity for a hearing," and then declare that the
patented nuclear technology "is of primary importance in the production or
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy" and that obtaining a license
to the technology "is of primary importance to effectuate the policies and purposes of
this [chapter]."234 If, after these steps, "any patent has been declared affected with
the public interest," the DOE may then obtain a license to practice the patented
technology.23 5 In addition, the DOE may sometimes be allowed to grant nonexclusive
licenses to authorized third parties 236 who have previously tried, but failed, to obtain
a license to the technology from the patent owner.23 7 Prior to granting any
compulsory licenses, the patent owner must be informed of any applications for
compulsory licenses, 238 and is entitled to further hearings to consider these
applications.2 3 9 If the DOE then finds that the patented technology "is of primary
importance in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy,'240 compulsory licensing "is of primary importance to the conduct of the
activities of the applicant," 241 the uses defined in the proposed compulsory licenses
"are of primary importance to the furtherance of policies and purposes of [Chapter
227

§ 7608).
228

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. at 1708-09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

42 U.S.C. § 7608(1)(A).

229Id.
230

Id. § 7608(1)(B).

231

I!d. § 7608(2).

232 Id.

§ 7608.
See id. §§ 2183-88.
234 Id. § 2183(a).
235 Id. § 2183(b).
236 Id. § 2183(b)(2).
237 Id. § 2183(c).
238 Id. § 2183(d)(1).
23) Id. § 2183(d).
240 Id. § 2183(e)(1).
241 Id. § 2183(e)(2).
233
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23, '"242 and the "applicant cannot otherwise obtain a patent license from the owner of
the patent on terms which the [DOE] deems to be reasonable for the intended use of
the patent to be made by such applicant,"243 then the DOE can grant a compulsory
license to the technology "on terms deemed equitable by the [DOE] and generally not
less fair than those granted by the patentee or by the [DOE] to similar licensees for
comparable use." 244

Another ground on which the DOE can grant a compulsory

license to patented technology "of primary use in the utilization or production of
special nuclear material or atomic energy" is triggered if the patent owner has
245
violated certain provisions of antitrust law.

As in the CAA, a patent owner whose patented technology is subject to
compulsory licensing is entitled to a "reasonable royalty fee from the licensee for any
use of [the patented invention]."246 In cases of dispute between the patent owner and
any party granted a compulsory license, the DOE may convene a special "Patent
Compensation Board" to help set a just level of compensation. 247 The DOE must set
the reasonable royalty after having considered the advice of the Patent
Compensation Board, 248 "any defense, general or special, that might be pleaded by a
defendant in an action for infringement," 249 the extent of federal funding that
contributed to the development of the patented invention, 250 and "the degree of
utility, novelty, and importance of the [patented] invention" and optionally "the cost
to the owner of the patent of developing ...

or acquiring [the patented invention]."251

Once the DOE has granted a compulsory license, a patent owner is no longer entitled
to injunctive relief with respect to practice of the patented technology authorized by
the compulsory license. 252
253
royalty fees.

However, a patent owner is entitled to recover unpaid

Compulsory licensing schemes could be used to allow the government or third
parties access to patented pollution abatement technologies. However, such use of
compulsory licensing could have an adverse effect on the incentives the patent
system creates to spur new technological innovation. 254 If inventors believed that
their inventions would be appropriated by the government via compulsory licensing,
thus depriving inventors of the monopoly right to exclude others and attendant
monopoly profits, the incentives created by the prospect of patent protection would
likely be weakened. Weakening patents could lead to lower levels of technological
development. In the case of biodiversity, compulsory licensing would be best justified
in cases where patented technologies critical to reducing pollution were insufficiently
available and the damage from continuing pollution were socially unacceptable. In
Id. § 2183(e)(3).
Id. § 2183(e)(4).
244 Id. § 2183(e).
245 Id. § 2188.
M>'Id. § 2183(g).
242
M

247

Id. § 2187.

248

Id. § 2187(c)(1)(A).

2MId. § 2187(c)(1)(B).

Id. § 2187(c)(1)(C).
Id. § 2187(c)(1)(D).
252 Id. § 2184.
250
251

253 Id.
254 U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
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addition, the prospect of compulsory licensing could help to avoid hold-outs by patent
owners, who would be encouraged to license their pollution abatement technologies
under reasonable terms rather than risk imposition of a compulsory license.

D. PatentsandPopulation
Human population has increased rapidly over the past two centuries, from 1
255
billion in 1800 to 1.6 billion in 1900 to the current level of more than 6 billion.
This rapid growth in human population is predicted to continue, with total
population reaching approximately 8.9 billion in 2050.256 Such a rate of increase is
remarkable for a large mammal:
The pattern of human population growth in the twentieth century was
more bacterial than primate. When Homo sapiens passed the six billion
mark we had already exceeded by as much as a hundred times the biomass
of any large animal species that ever existed on the land. We and the rest
257
of life cannot afford another hundred years like that.

As human populations have increased, other forms of biodiversity have become
increasingly crowded out. When livestock, crops, pets, and other human commensals
are considered, human and human-associated populations constitute one of the
258
greatest, and most rapidly increasing, threats to biodiversity.
Technological innovation has the potential to reduce the impact that human
population growth places on biodiversity by increasing the efficiency of human
technologies. Consider the equation IB = PAT, where 1B represents impact on
biodiversity, P represents human population (that is, number of people), A represents
affluence (that is, wealth per person), and T represents technological efficiency (that
is, 1B per wealth generated). This "IPAT identity" was first proposed by Paul Ehrlich
in the early 1970s as a simple, but comprehensive, method to express the effects that
human population, as amplified by affluence and technology, have on the
environment. 259 Impact (I) can represent impact on the environment, in general, or it
can represent impact on a particular aspect of the environment, such as 1B (that is,
impact on biodiversity).260

As either human population (P) or affluence (A) increase, so does impact on
biodiversity (TB).
Technology (T) has a subtler relationship with 1B, because
improvements in technology often lead to more efficient methods of producing wealth.
Although early interpretations of the I = PAT equation tended to emphasize the
environmental harms that new technologies can cause, technology is increasingly
255 WILSON, FUTURE OF LIFE, supra note 14, at 28-29.

supra note 19, at 325.
supra note 14, at 29.
258 See id. at 50 (stating that human population is the "prime mover" of the other HIPPO
factors).
250; SUSTAINING LIFE,

257 WILSON, FUTURE OF LIFE,

259

See Marian R. Chertow, The IPAT Equation and Its Variants: Changing Views of

Technology and EnvironmentalImpact, 4 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 13, 15 (2001) [hereinafter Chertow,

Changing Views].
20

See id. at 15, 17.
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viewed as a means of ameliorating the environmental harms caused by population
and affluence. For example,
The World Resources Institute studies of industrial ecology reinterpreted
IPAT to suggest that given increases in population and affluence, the T
term of the IPAT equation then becomes an essential counterweight to P
and A requiring environmentally effective technological choices to reduce
261
environmental impact per unit of economic activity.
As with environmental impact, in general, technological innovation can also act as an
essential counterweight to the negative effects that P and A have on biodiversity, or
IB.

More efficient methods of producing wealth lead to lower impact per wealth,
thus decreasing the value of T. 262 Just as increases in population and affluence drive
1B upwards, technological innovation can drive it downwards.
Thus, technological
innovation can help to counteract the effects of population (and attendant wealth) on
biodiversity.
The patent system is intended to spur technological innovation. As Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 states, Congress shall have power "To promote the Progress
of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective ...Discoveries." 263 Patents are highly relevant to the T in the IB =
PAT equation. Progress of useful arts can reduce the value of T, thereby reducing
the value of IB and acting as a counterbalance to upwards pressures exerted by
increasing population (P) and affluence (A). In theory, patent protection is intended
to spur technological innovation by creating incentives for inventors to devote their
valuable money, time, and talents to the invention of new technologies. 264 Without
patent protection or trade secrecy, innovations can be freely appropriated by others,
dissipating the incentive to invent. 265 Patent protection prevents such free-riding,
and provides inventors with the prospect of compensation for their investment in
inventing new technologies. 266 Without patent protection, inventive activity would be
less than socially optimal, and would result in correspondingly less than socially
optimal technological innovation. 267 By internalizing the externalities caused by
268
free-riding, a patent system creates an incentive to innovate.
In the case of 1B, the patent system will tend to incentivize higher rates of
technological innovation that drive the value of T downwards, which, in turn will
decrease the impact on biodiversity.
This outcome is especially beneficial to
261 Marian R. Chertow, IPATEquation, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Cutler J. Cleveland & John
Felleman eds. 2008), http://www.eoearth.org/article/IPAT-equation (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
2 2 That is, if one were to hold impact (I) and population (P) constant, but per capita wealth (A)
were to continue to increase, the value of technology (T) would have to decrease (that is, technology
would have to become more efficient) in order to compensate for the rise in A.
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2W Id.
265 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.

266
267
208

Id. at ch. 2, at 4-5.
Id. at ch. 2, at 4.
Id.
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biodiversity conservation as long as the P and A factors in the
continue to increase their adverse impact on biodiversity.

1B

=

PAT equation

E. Patentsand Overexploitation
Populations of marine organisms, such as fish and shrimp, are among the most
overexploited forms of biodiversity worldwide. 269 Over the last several decades,
fishery after fishery has been reduced by unsustainable catches. 270 Fish occupying
higher tropic levels, such as tuna and swordfish, have experienced the worst
population declines, and sometimes even population collapses. 271 Perhaps the best
example of a fishery collapse is the Atlantic Cod, which has been driven to the point
272
of commercial extinction by overfishing.
Beyond the negative effects on populations of targeted marine organisms, fishing
can cause devastation to other marine organisms caught incidentally in fishing nets.
Such organisms caught unintentionally are called "bycatch."273 The Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") describes bycatch as "Fish or
other fauna (e.g. birds or marine mammals) that are caught during fishing, but
which are not sold or kept for personal use." 274 Bycatch can represent a large
proportion of what is caught in a fishing net. For example, in shrimp fisheries the
ratio of bycatch to intended catch can reach 20:1.275 Fishermen generally consider
bycatch undesirable because it creates extra drag for fishing boats, displaces target
fish from fishing nets, and can even damage or destroy fishing nets. 276 As long ago as
1947, Louis and Charles L. Guthrie filed a patent application in the USPTO claiming
an improved "Shrimp Trawling Net" capable of ensuring that "shrimp [are]
effectively prevented from escaping" while "escape of small fish of the waste variety
277
is permitted."
In addition to non-target fish, bycatch often includes larger organisms, such as
whales, dolphins, birds, and sea turtles, which usually drown while trapped inside

269 See ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS OF THE OCEANS AND COASTS 62-64 (Murray Patterson &

Bruce Glavovic eds, 2008) (discussing the changes in marine species populations and the "concern
about the 'collapse' of fisheries due to overexploitation").
270Daniel Pauly & Maria-Lourdes Palomares, Fishing Down Marine Food We."ItisFar More
Pervasive than We Thought,76 BULL. OF MARINE SCI. 197, 197 (2005).
271See Christian Mullon, Pierre Freon, & Philippe Cury, The Dynamics of Collapse in World
Fis heries, 6 FISH & FISHERIES 111, 116 tbl.1 (2005).
272 See CHARLES CLOVER, THE END OF THE LINE: HOW OVERFISHING IS CHANGING THE WORLD

AND WHAT WE EAT 214-17 (The New Press 2006) (2004).
273OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - By-catch Definition, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/

detail.asp?ID=252 (last visited March 21, 2010).
274 Id.
275See Ivor Clucas, A Study of the Options for Utilization ofByeatch and Discards from Marine
Capture Fisheries ch. 9 (Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Fisheries Circular No. 928, Oct.
1997), available at http ://www.fao.org/docrep/w6602e/w6602e00.htm.
276 See STEVE EAYRS, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A GUIDE TO BYCATCH

REDUCTION IN TROPICAL SHRIMP-TRAWL FISHERIES 9 (rev. ed. 2007), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/

DOCUMENT/rebyc/a 1008e.pdf.
277 U.S. Patent No. 2,511,057 col. 111. 6-8 (filed Feb. 13, 1947) (issued June 13, 1950).
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fishing nets. 278 Sea turtles, all seven extant species of which are currently listed as
endangered or threatened, are especially vulnerable to becoming bycatch in shrimp
trawl nets. 279 However, the patent system has played a strong role in spurring the
creation of an ingenious and relatively effective invention that has helped to prevent
many sea turtles from dying as bycatch: the turtle excluder device ("TED").
On March 19, 1987, Noah J. Saunders filed patent application 27,875 (issued as
U.S. Patent Number 4,739,574, "the '875 patent"), entitled "Turtle Excluder Device,"
with the USPTO. 280 It claimed
A device for exclusion of sea turtles from a shrimp net during trawling
stream flow, adapted for insertion within the trawl body before the cod end
281
of a continuous shrimp trawl net ....
In the specification of the '875 patent, Saunders explained how a shrimp trawling net
is tapered in shape so that shrimp enter through the open, wide frontal end of the
net, and then drift back into the net's narrower rear, collecting section. 28 2 However,
Saunders recognized a problem with this shrimp net design:
The speed of the tow captures in the nets more sea creatures than the
desired shrimp; this is exacerbated by the fact that shrimp is also the
preferred food of numerous marine species including fish and marine
reptiles, especially turtles. The overall trawl speed is such, when trawling
for shrimp, that average marine fish can swim against the speed of the flow,
and in fact fish can readily enter into the cod [front] end and swim out of
the cod end against the force of the flow stream.
Marine reptiles, especially sea turtles, while readily captured in such an
arrangement do not have the swimming strength to escape from the cod
end. Since a marine reptile, unlike fish, is an air breathing creature the
reptile will drown before a given trawl is finished and the nets are raised
and dumped. This has provided for a considerable ecological problem where
at least one specie [sic] of sea turtles, Kemp's Ridley turtles, is already an
endangered species.
Ecologists have noted over three hundred kills,
attributed to the effects of shrimp trawling.

278 MICHAEL

J.

BEAN & MELANIE

J.

ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW

160-61 (3d ed. 1997).
279 Soo genorally SHERYAN EPPERLY ET AL.,

U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NAT'L OCEANIC &

ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ANALYSIS OF SEA TURTLE BYCATCH IN THE COMMERCIAL SHRIMP FISHERIES
OF SOUTHEAST U.S. WATERS AND THE GULF OF MEXICO (2002), available at http://www.sefsc.noaa.

gov/PDFdocs/memo-490.pdf (discussing the mortality of sea turtles bycatch in the shrimp fishing
industry).
280 U.S. Patent No. 4,739,574, at [54] (filed Mar. 19, 1987) (issued Apr. 26, 1988).
281

Id.

282

Id. col. 1I1. 17-21.

col. 6 11. 1-4.
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As a result, it has become a matter of public policy to provide a device or
apparatus permitting the escape or exclusion or captured sea turtles.283
Saunders noted that a TED should be inexpensive enough to be affordable by all
28 4
shrimp fishermen, and that it must prevent significant loss of shrimp from the net.
In addition, he cited specific shrimp fishing regulations (that is, "50 C.F.R. §§217,
222, and 227") that, at the time he filed his patent application, had been proposed by
28 5
the federal "National Marine Fisheries" agency.
The '875 patent explicitly acknowledges that the threatened loss of one form of
biodiversity-sea turtles-provided motivation for the invention of a new technology
to help prevent such biodiversity loss. 28 6 However, the fact that Saunders decided to
seek patent protection for his new TED invention may also indicate a desire to
28 7
benefit financially from his technological solution to the problem of turtle bycatch.
After all, even with the best of conservation intentions, it is more probable that a
rational inventor will choose to invest her valuable time, energy, and talent in
inventing new conservation technologies if patent protection provides her with an
opportunity to control and profit from her invention. 28 8 In the case of Saunders' TED,
the '875 patent afforded the inventor the opportunity to be the sole manufacturer,
supplier, or licensor of his new invention. 28 9 Saunders might help save sea turtles
drowning while simultaneously profiting from his inventive efforts. This example
illustrates that a threat to biodiversity can, at least in part, spur technological
innovation that ameliorates such a threat, and that the patent system may facilitate
290
such a beneficial outcome.

CONCLUSION

Patents and biodiversity might seem strange bedfellows. In fact, some would
implicate the patent system, and the new technological innovations it is meant to
spur, as a serious threat to biodiversity. However, the patent system possesses a
powerful set of tools that can be used to assist in the goal of combating the current
biodiversity extinction crisis. For each of the HIPPO factors that describe the major
threats to biodiversity, patents can benefit biodiversity. An extinction bar to
patentability creates incentives for bioprospectors, companies, and countries that
host abundant biodiversity to prevent habitat destruction. Sovereign immunity
provides the federal and state governments with the right to immediate access to
Id.col. 111. 24-46.
Id.col. 111. 46-53.
285 Id. col. 111. 54-60.
286Id.col. 111. 33-46.
287 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., concurring).
288 See id.
289 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
290 In addition to the '875 patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,739,574 (filed Mar. 19, 1987) (issued Apr.
26, 1988), U.S. Patent No. 5,076,000 (filed Jan. 8, 1990) (issued Dec. 31, 1991), U.S. Patent No.
5,222,318 (filed Apr. 1, 1991) (issued June 29, 1993), U.S. Patent No. 5,325,619 (filed Oct. 26, 1992)
(issued July 5, 1994), and U.S. Patent No. 5,575,102 (filed Mar. 16, 1995) (issued Nov. 19, 1996) all
pertain to TEDs.
283

284
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patented inventions useful or necessary in curbing the spread of invasives. Existing
federal compulsory licensing schemes provide models for how pollution abatement
technologies could, if necessary, be widely disseminated to combat pollution. The
incentives created by the patent system can, and do, help to create more efficient new
technologies that help to counteract the damage inflicted on biodiversity by human
population and its inexorable growth. And, the patent system has already proved
itself adept at spurring the creation of ingenious inventions, such as TEDs, capable of
alleviating overexploitation of natural populations. In these and many other ways,
the patent system can be a valuable ally in the vital struggle to preserve biodiversity.

